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WHEN WARNINGS ALONE WON'T DO: 
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR PHILLIPS 
by Richard C. Ausness· 
INTRODUCTION 
In his paper, Professor Phillips contends that questions about the 
adequacy of a product's design should be resolved by the use of a risk-utility 
test and that the existence of an adequate warning should merely be one 
factor for the jury to take into account.2 This is essentially the position 
espoused by the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 
(hereinafter Third Restatement), section 2, comment 1.3 On the other himd, 
Professor PhiIlips is very critical of subsections 6(c) and 6(d).4 These 
provisions establish liability for the sellers of prescription drugs and medical 
devices. Section 6(c), which is concerned with design defect claims/ 
protects manufacturers and other sellers from liability as long as a 
reasonable health-care provider would prescribe their product to some class 
of patients. Section 6(d), which deals with the duty to warn,6 penn its 
manufacturers of prescription drugs and medical devices to satisfy their duty 
to warn, at least in most instances, by communicating the warning to the 
prescribing physician rather than the patient. In other words, section 6( d) 
retains the traditional "learned intennediary" rule. 
Although I agree with Professor Phillips that a manufacturer should 
not always avoid liability for defective design by proving that it provided an 
adequate warning, I have serious doubts about the wisdom of adopting a 
sweeping rule such as the one set forth in comment I.' In my opinion, 
1. Ashland Oil Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. 
2. See Jerry J. Phillips, Products Liability: Beyond Warnings, 26 N. Ky. L. REv. 595 
(1999). 
3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcrs LIABn.ITY § 2 cmt. 1(1998). 
4. See Id. §§ 6(c)-(d); See also Phillips, supra note 2, at 9-16 (noting the provisions lack 
any precedent in case law, are filled with ambiguities, and will probably prove unworkable). 
5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c). 
6. See Id. § 6(d). 
TId. § 2 cmt.l. 
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comment l's approach is economically inefficient and undercuts the moral 
values of individual autonomy and personal responsibility. There is simply 
no social or economic benefit to be gained by giving large damage awards 
to product users who fail to follow simple instructions or heed clear 
warnings. 
I also disagree with Professor Phillips' view of section 6 of the 
Third Restatement.8 I believe that the Third Restatement's approach in 
section 6( c), which gives broad protection to manufacturers of prescription 
drugs and medical devices,9 is the correct one even though it leaves injured 
consumers with less protection than they might otherwise have. I also 
believe that section 6( d)' s retention of the learned intermediary rule is 
sensible and I find the Reporters' policy justifications for retaining the rule 
to be persuasive. . 
THE RELATION BETWEEN DESIGN DEFECT AND FAILURE-TO-
WARN CLAIMS 
Section 2 of the Third Restatement identifies three categories of 
product defect: manufacturing defects, design defects and defects arising 
from inadequate instructions or warnings. 10 According to the Third 
Restatemen~ a manufacturing defect occurs when a product fails to conform 
to its intended design.11 In contrast, a product is defectively designed when 
product-related risks could be reduced or avoided by the use of a reasonable 
alternative design and when the failure to incorporate such a design causes 
the product to be "not reasonably safe.,,12 Finally, a product may be 
defective when product-related risks could be lowered or prevented by 
8. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 10 (concluding that the provisions lack any precedent in 
case law, are filled with ambiguities. and will probably prove unworkable). 
9. See [d. § 2. 
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LlABnJTY § 2 (1998). 
II. [d. § 2(a) (stating that a product "contains a manufacturing defect when the product 
departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the 
preparation and marketing of the product"). 
12. [d. § 2(b) (declaring a product is defective in design "when the foreseeable risks of 
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a 
reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the 
product not reasonably safe"). 
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reasonable instructions or warnings and when the failure to provide such
instructions or warnings results in a product that is not reasonably safe."
This classification scheme is widely accepted by courts "4 and legal
commentators. 5
According to Professor Phillips, design defect claims and failure-to-
warn claims should be regarded as separate and independent and not
mutually exclusive. 6 He bases this conclusion, at least in part, on the text
of the Third Restatement.7 As mentioned earlier, the Third Restatement
13. Id. § 2(c) (providing that a product may be defective because of inadequate instructions
or warnings when "the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission
of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe").
14. See, e.g., Lantis v. Astec Indus., Inc., 648 F.2d 1118, 1120 (7" Cir. 1981) (declaring
that "a product may be found defective within the meaning of Section 402(A) because of
either a manufacturing flaw, a defective design or a failure to warn of dangers in the use of
the product"); Gianitsis v. American Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 856 (D.N.H. 1988)
(observing that plaintiff may bring a claim "for injuries arising out of the defective design
of the product, defect in the manufacture of a product, or a defect in the failure to provide
adequate warnings in conjunction with the use of the product"); Piper v. Bear Medical
Systems, 883 P.2d 407, 410-11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "three types of defects
can result in an unreasonably dangerous product: manufacturing defects, design defects, and
informational defects encompassing instructions and warnings").
15. See, e.g., David G. Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and
Untaken in the New Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1241, 1243 (1994) (declaring that
"[t]oday, most courts and commentators accept as axiomatic the fundamental distinctions
between three very different forms of product defect: (1) manufacturing flaws, (2) design
inadequacies, and (3) insufficient warnings of danger and instructions on safe use"); Jerry
J. Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 317,
342 (1978) (stating that "[p]roduct defects are now typically divided into three categories:
manufacturing or production defects; design defects; and defects attributable to the absence
or insufficiency of warnings or instructions for use of the product"); William C. Powers, Jr.,
The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REv. 777, 782 (1984) (observing
that "[d]efects generally are classified in three categories: flaws or manufacturing defects,
design defects, and warning or informational defects"); but see Frank J. Vandall, The
Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, Section 2(b): Design Defect, 68 TEMPLE
L. REv. 167, 176-79 (1995) (pointing out that courts do not always clearly distinguish
between manufacturing or design defects).
16. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 3-4, 26.
17. Id. at 4 (quoting comment I to section 2 stating that "[w]amings are not ... a
substitute for the provision of a reasonably safe design").
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recognizes the aforementioned three types of product defect and establishes
separate criteria for each category. It would seem to follow, therefore, that
if one product can be defective because it has a bad design as defined by
section 2(b), while another product can be defective because it has a bad
warning as defined by section 2(c), it is possible that a third product may
suffer from both a defective design and an inadequate warning. In such a
case, there is nothing in the Third Restatement that would require the
plaintiffto elect between the design defect claim and the inadequate warning
claim. On the contrary, in such a case, the plaintiff could presumably
proceed under either or both theories.
Lawsuits based on both defective design and failure-to-warn
theories have been brought without challenge for many years. 8 Indeed,
Gosewisch v. American Honda Company 9 was the only appellate case I
could find where a defendant even raised the issue. The plaintiff in
Gosewisch was severely injured while riding a three-wheel All Terrain
Cycle (ATC) manufactured by the defendant, Honda Motor Compan ° He
alleged that the vehicle had a number of design flaws which caused it to flip
forward unexpectedly.' The plaintiff also claimed that Honda was grossly
negligent because it failed to warn customers about the unstable
characteristics of itsATCs.22 The trial court refused to allow the plaintiff's
failure-to-warn claim to go before the jury because the plaintiff had already
alleged that the product was defectively designed.23 The jury subsequently
found in favor of the defendant on the design defect claim and the plaintiff
18. See Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1229 (4' Cir. 1984) (asserting design
defect and failure-to-warn claims in suit against manufacturer of cardiac pacemaker);
Hurley v. Lederle Labs., 651 F. Supp. 993, 994 (E.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd on other grounds,
851 F.2d 1536 (5"h Cir.), superseded by 863 F.2d 1173 (5"' Cir. 1988) (suit against
manufacturer of whole-cell diptheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccine alleging both defective design
and inadequate warning); Piper v. Bear Medical Systems, 883 P.2d 407, 411-15 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1993) (suit against manufacturer of ventilator based upon both defective design and
inadequate warning).
19. 737 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1987).
20. Id. at 378.
21. Id. These design flaws included (1) low tire pressure; (2) failure to install a mechanical
suspension system; (3) a high center of gravity; (4) weak front forks; and (5) badly designed
front wheel brakes. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id
[Vol. 26:3
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appealed.24
The intermediate appellate court affirmed the lower court's
decision,25 but was itself reversed by the Arizona Supreme Court.26 That
court acknowledged that the defective design claim and the failure-to-warn
claim were independent of each other and, therefore, could be separately
considered by the jury.27 According to the Gosewisch court, "[a] plaintiff is
not required to make an election between pursuing a case on a strict products
liability theory of either design defect or failure to warn."28
ADEQUATE WARNINGS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR SAFER
PRODUCT DESIGN
Professor Phillips concludes that because design defects and
inadequate warning defects are distinct categories, a manufacturer should
not be able to cut off liability for defective design simply by providing an
effective warning about design-related (as opposed to inherent) risks.29 I
must concede that the Third Restatement, as well as many appellate court
decisions, agree with Professor Phillips.
24. Id.
25. See Gosewisch v. American Honda Company, 737 P.2d 365, 368 (Ariz Ct. App. 1985)
(declaring that "[blecause plaintiffs here did not contend at trial that the ATC was faultlessly
manufactured and designed-their sole contention being that the vehicle had design defects-
there was no error in failing to give the instruction"). The intermediate appellate court relied
on Embry v. General Motors Corp., 565 P.2d 1294 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977), a case which
involved allegedly defective motor mounts. The court in Embry also affirmed a lower
court's refusal to give a failure-to-warn instruction, finding that it was redundant because
the only danger involved was that created by the defective design. Id. at 1297.
26. Id. at 383.
27. Id. at 379.
28. Id.
29. Professor Phillips has maintained this view for years. See Jerry Phillips, The
Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CN. L. REV.
101, 106 (1977) ("There may be instances where the product is so dangerous that
the courts will find the seller's obligation cannot be fulfilled merely by warning.").
See also Phillips, supra note 2, at 4-8 (citing Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 114
F.3d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
1999]
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A. The Issue from a Doctrinal Perspective
As Professor Phillips points out,30 there is considerable doctrinal
support for the proposition that adequate warnings will not necessarily
insulate a manufacturer from liability when it is possible to reduce or avoid
the harm by redesigning the product.3 A few courts, however, have taken
the opposite view.32
1. The Third Restatement and Comment 1
Although section 2 of the Third Restatement identifies three distinct
types of product defects and implies that litigants are not required to elect
among them when they bring suit against manufacturers, it does not tell us
whether a manufacturer may respond to a product-related risk by providing
an adequate warning as an alternative to eliminatingthe risk by an improved
design. Comment I to section 2, however, does expressly address this issue.
This provision states that "5]n general, when a safer design can reasonably
be implemented and risks can reasonably be designed out of a product,
adoption of the safer design is required over a warning that leaves a
30. Phillips, supra note 2, at 4-8 (citing Uloth v. City Tank Corp. 384 N.E.2d 1188,
1193 (1978) (holding that a product may be defectively designed even if there are
warnings to be found adequate, or if the dangers are obvious); Rogers v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that an adequate warning
will not automatically discharge the defendant manufacturer's duty to design a
safer product)).
31. See Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44 (Alaska 1979) (declaring that
where the most stringent warning will not protect the public, gun manufacturer must
eliminate the defect itself); Eads v. R.D. Werner Co., 847 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Nev. 1993)
(holding that an adequate warning will not shield a ladder manufacturer from liability if the
defect involved could have been corrected through the use of a commercially feasible
alternative design); Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 808 P.2d 522, 524-25 (Nev. 1993)
(concluding that an adequate warning will not prevent the manufacturer of a box-crushing
machine from being held liable for defective design if it fails to provide a safety device that
is commercially feasible and will not affect product efficiency).
32. See Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 527 A.2d 1337 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)
(rejecting plaintiff's design defect claim with respect to gasoline container when plaintiff's
parents ignored explicit warnings); Taylor v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 520 N.E.2d 1375
(Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (holding that plaintiff could not bring design defect claim against
truck manufacturer when danger from design flaw was obvious).
[Vol. 26:3
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significant residuum of such risks."33 This, of course, is fully consistent
with Professor Phillips' position.34
The Reporters of the Third Restatement offer the following
rationale to support their position in commentl: An obvious risk puts the
user or consumer on notice that the product is dangerous in some respect.35
However, the obviousness of the risk does not ordinarily relieve the
manufacturer of its duty to provide a safer design because consumers who
are unable to avoid obvious risks will suffer avoidable injuries unless
manufacturers are encouraged to develop safer designs for their products.36
Warnings are similar to obvious risks in the sense that they also provide
notice to consumers. Since consumers often ignore warnings, just as they
ignore obvious risks, the same accident-cost-avoidance considerations that
require manufacturers to eliminate obvious risks through better design also
justify requiring manufacturers to eliminate latent risks through better design
as opposed to merely warning about them. 7
In the Reporters' Note to section 2, the drafters tacitly acknowledge
that the new comment I is inconsistent with commentj to the superseded
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts(hereinafter the Second
Restatement).3  Commentj declared that "[w]here a warning is given, the
seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product
33. See RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. I (1998).
34. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 8 (indicating that "it seems more responsible to put the
loss on the generally better accident avoider, the manufacturer...
35"Id.
36. See Camacho v. Honda Motor Ltd., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246 (Colo. 1987) (declaring that
"[u]ncritical rejection of design defect claims in all cases wherein the danger may be open
and obvious thus contravenes sound public policy by encouraging design strategies which
perpetuate the manufacture of dangerous products").
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 2 cmt. I (1998).
Moreover, some courts have concluded that there may be duty to warn even when the risk
is an obvious one. See Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 475 A.2d 1243, 1252 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1984) (holding that there is no valid reason for automatic preclusion of liability based
solely upon obviousness of danger in an action based on failure to warn); Campos v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 485 A.2d 305, 309-10 (N.J. 1984) (stating that "in our state
the obviousness of a danger, as distinguished from a plaintiff's subjective knowledge of the
danger, is merely one element to be factored into the analysis to determine whether a duty
to warn exists").
38. See RESTATEmENT (THID) OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LLABIUMY § 2 (1998) (Reporters' Note
101).
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bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in
defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."39 The drafters of
comment! have rejected the approach of the old commeny for two reasons:
first, it is inconsistent with the judicial abandonment of the patent danger
rule;4° and, second, a growing body of social science research suggests that
warnings are not always very efficient accident-cost-avoidance
mechanisms.4
The Reporters cite Uloth v. City Tank Corp.42 to support their
conclusion that an adequate warning cannot redeem a defective design.43
The plaintiffin Uloth, a sanitation worker, was injured when a garbage truck
packer blade severed his foot. "' The plaintiff brought suit against the
manufacturer of the truck, claiming that the truck's compactor mechanism
had been defectively designed. 45 The plaintiff also showed that several
safety devices were available that would have prevented the accident
without affecting the efficiency of the producte6 In response, the defendant
argued that the court should disallow the plaintiff's design defect claim if an
adequate warning had been given.47 The trial court rejected this argument
and the jury eventually found in favor of the plaintiff.4
The lower court's judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed on
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
40. See Camacho v. Honda Motor Ltd., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246-47 (Colo. 1987) (rejecting
the patent danger rule in a design defect case involving failure to provide crash bars on
motorcycle); Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co., 551 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Ind. 1990)
(rejecting the patent danger rule in a products liability case where the manufacturer of a
meat-slicing machine failed to provide shielding); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326
N.W.2d 372, 377 (Mich. 1982) (rejecting the patent danger rule in a design defect case
involving failure to provide driver restraint devices on forklift).
41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § (1998) (Reporters' Note
101) (citing Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations,
41 UCLA L. REv. 1193 (1994)).
42. 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978).
43See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LLALrry § 2 (1998) (Reporters' Note
101).
44. Uloth, 384 N.E.2d at 1190-91.
45. Id. at 1191.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1191-92.
48. Id. at 1190.
[Vol. 26:3
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appeal.49 The appellate court refused to adopt a rule which permitted a
manufacturer to discharge its duty to consumers by simply issuing a warning
about product-related dangers."0 Instead, the court declared that the
adequacy of any warning given (or the obviousness of the danger if a
warning was not given) was a factor that could be considered in determining
whether the product was defectively designed.5
The Uloth court based its decision on the assumption that
manufacturers had more control over product-related risks than consumers.
For example, the court observed that workers often had no choice but to
work with dangerous products and almost no ability to reduce these product-
related risks.52 In addition, warnings did little to eliminate accidents that
were caused by inadvertence, instinctual reactions or forgetfulness. 3
Manufacturers, on the other hand, could anticipate these accident scenarios
and often had the ability, through design changes, to reduce or eliminate
product-related risks at relatively small cost' 4 For this reason, in the court's
view, it made sense to place the burden of reducing product-related risks on
manufacturers instead of allowing this burden to be shifted to users and
consumers.
55
2. Recent Decisions Adopting the Third Restatement's Position
Recently, a number of courts have expressly relied on commeni to
conclude that adequate warnings are no substitute for safer designs. Two of
these cases, discussed by Professor Phillips, are Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co.56 and Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez.7
In Rogers, the plaintiff, a member of a road construction crew, was
seriously injured when a large machine backed into her while she was
directing traffic at a busy work site.5" The machine in question, known as
49. Id. at 1195.
50. Id. at 1192.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 144 F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
57. 977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998).
58. Rogers, 144 F.3d at 842.
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a MT-6520 milling machine, was being used to strip away layers of asphalt
from a road. 9 The driver of the MT-6520 did not see the plaintiff because
she was standing in a blind spot, and the plaintiff did not hear the machine
approaching because its alarm system did not function properly.' The
plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the MT-6520, alleging that the machine
was defectively designed because it did not have rear-view mirrors, kill
switches or a reliable alarm systems' At the end of the trial, the defendant
proposed a jury instruction that would have effectively precluded liability
as long as the manufacturer provided an adequate warnin6.2 The trial court,
however, refused to give the requested instruction and the jury returned a
$16.7 million verdict for the plaintiff.
3
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's ruling.' It concluded that courts in the District of Columbia
had adopted a risk-utility test for use in design defect cases. 65 Under this
approach, the Rogers court declared, a defendant could show that a warning
reduced a product's dangers (and, therefore, reduced the risk side of the risk-
utility equation), but that a warning would not necessarily be determinative
on the issue of defectiveness when an alternative safer design was
available.6 In the court's words, "[]t is thus not correct that a manufacturer
may, under the law of the District of Columbia, merely slap a warning onto
its dangerous product, and absolve itself of any obligation to do more. 67
Indeed, as the court observed, a warning would have done very little
to reduce the danger that the MT-6520 would accidently back into an
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 843.
62. Id. The MT-6520's maintenance manual stated that other workers should stay at least
ten feet away from the machine while it was operating. It also admonished the operator to
verify that the alarm worked and to check for people in the area. Finally, a sign on the
machine itself warned people to stay ten feet away. Id.
63. Id. at 842-43. Ten million and two-hundred thousand dollars were awarded for
compensatory damages along with another $6.5 million in punitive damages. Id. at 842.
The district court opinion is reported at 971 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1997).
64. See Rogers, 144 F.3d at 842.
65. Id. at 843 (citing Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co., Inc. v. Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276
(D.C. 1995)).
66. Id. at 844-45.
67. Id. at 844.
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unsuspecting worker.68 In such a case, therefore, the manufacturer was
legally obligated to incorporate additional safety features, where feasible, to
guard against foreseeable harm.69 TheRogers court bolstered its decision
by citing comment I of the Third Restatement, implicitly adopting the
reasoning of that comment and the Uloth case.7"
The Third Restatement's approach was also endorsed by the Texas
Supreme Court in Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez.7' In that case,
an automobile mechanic was injured when a 16-inch tire exploded as he
was attempting to mount it on a 16.5-inch rim.72 The plaintiff contended
that the tire was defectively designed because it used a 0.037-inch multi-
strand weftless bead on the tire instead of safer 0.050-inch single strand
programmed bead. 7' The jury found in the plaintiff s favor and awarded
him $5.5 million in compensatory damages and $11.5 million in punitive
damages. 74  This judgment was affirmed by an intermediate appellate
court,75 and ultimately by the Texas Supreme Court.76
Attached to the tire in question was a prominent label which warned
against mounting the tire on a 16.5-inch rim, failing to use a tire mounting
machine, inflating the tire without using an extension hose, or reaching over
the tire during inflation.77 The plaintiff, who had inflated more than a
thousand tires during his career, ignored all of these warnings. 78 The tire
manufacturer urged the court to adopt the rule enunciated in commeny to
section 402A of the Second Restatement, which provided that an adequate
warning would prevent design defect liability.79 The court, however,
rejected comment j in favor of the position set forth in commentl of the
68. Id. at 845.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998).
72. Id. at 331-32.
73. Id. at 333-34.
74. Id. at 334. The compensatory award was later reduced to $4.1 million and the punitive
award was reduced to $4.1 million as well, resulting in a final award of $10.3 million,
including interest. Id.
75. 928 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
76. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d at 331.
77. Id. at 332.
78. Id. at 343 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
79. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d at 335-36.
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Third Restatemend' and held that "warnings and safer alternative designs are
factors, among others, for the jury to consider in determining whether the
product as designed is reasonably safe.'8 ' Applying the Third Restatement's
approach, the court in Martinez concluded that the jury could have
reasonably found that the tire was defectively designed. 2
3. The Minority View
Although the rule set forth in the Third Restatement no doubt
represents the prevailing view, there is some case law to the contrary.
Simpson v. Standard Container Co.3 and Taylor v. Yale & Towne
Manufacturing Co." are illustrative. The Simpson case involved a four-
year-old child who was injured by burning gasoline." The plaintiff and a
companion took the cap off a gasoline container and spilled it on the floo 6
The fumes from the spilled gasoline somehow ignited, injuring the
plaintiff."' The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the gasoline container,
arguing that the container should have been equipped with a child-proof
cap."8 The trial court dismissed the case and the plaintiff appealed. 9 The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals upheld the lower court's ruling.90
The appellate court based its conclusion in part on the fact that the
product was not being used for its intended purpose"' In the court's view,
the storing of the gasoline container where unsupervised four-year-old
children could play with it was unforeseeable misuse.92 In addition, the
court relied on section 402A, commentj to conclude that the container was
not unreasonably dangerous since clear warnings were affixed to it which
80. Id. at 336.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 527 A.2d 1337 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
84. 520 N.E.2d 1375 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
85. Simpson, 527 A.2d at 1339.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1339
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1338.
90. Id. at 1341.
91. Id. at 1340-41.
92. Id. at 1341.
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directed consumers to "Keep Out of Reach of Children" and "Do Not Store
in Vehicle or Living Space.'93 Apparently, the Simpson court felt that it was
appropriate to put the burden on the parents to keep the gasoline container
away from small children.
An Ohio intermediate appellate court reached a similar result in
Taylor v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co.94 In that case, a worker was
injured by an explosion at a cement plant.95 The explosion occurred when
sparks from a truck manufactured by the defendant ignited fumes that were
emanating from the "mix center" at the plant9 6 The injured worker brought
suit against the truck manufacturer, alleging failure to warn and defective
design; however, the trial court granted a motion for directed verdict in favor
of the defendant.97 This decision was affirmed by the Ohio Court of
Appeals.98
According to the Taylor court, the only evidence the plaintiff
presented in support of his design defect claim was that the defendant failed
to warn about the Yale truck's tendency to spark." The court, however,
observed that the plaintiff and other workers at the plant were well aware of
this characteristic "and, consequently, rejected the plaintiff's design defect
claim.' ' Relying on section 402A, comment j, the Taylor court also
disallowed the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claim, declaring that the
manufacturer had no duty to warn about an obvious hazard.'1
2
B. The Issue from a Policy Perspective
Various policies can be invoked to support the approach taken by
comment 1. For example, the comment I approach appears to promote
economic efficiency by imposing liability on the cheapest costavoider 3
93. Id.
94. 520 N.E.2d 1375 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
95. Id. at 1376.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1378.
99. Id. at 1377-78.
100. Id. at 1377.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1378.
103. According to Guido Calabresi, the cheapest cost avoider is the party who "an arbitrary
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In addition, one can argue that the rule set forth in commentl is consistent
with tort law's distributive goals because it shifts accident costs to the best
loss-spreader. In my view, however, the efficiency and loss-spreading
effects of commentl's approach are overrated. Furthermore, the comment
1 approach arguably produces outcomes that are inconsistent with moral
values.
1. Accident Costs
It is generally assumed that accident costs will be optimized if
product sellers are held liable for product-related injuries." Producers,
because of their control over the design and production processes, are
deemed to be in a better position than consumers to discover and correct
dangerous characteristics in their products. 5 Subjecting producers to
liability provides an incentive for them to improve the safety of their
products when it is cost-effective to do so."° However, producers are not
always the cheapest cost avoiders. Sometimes, consumers are able to bear
some product-related risks more cheaply than producers, and in such cases,
it may be better to shift these risks to them. Thus, it makes sense to require
manufacturers to make design improvements when the risk involved is
inherent and unavoidable or when consumers cannot reasonably be expected
initial bearer of accident costs would (in the absence of transaction and information costs)
find it most worthwhile to 'bribe' in order to obtain that modification of behavior which
would lessen accident costs most." See GuiDo CALABRESi, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS 135
(1970).
104. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STuD. 461, 520 (1985) (declaring
that "[slociety will benefit from internalizing the costs of operation to product
manufacturers, including losses resulting from product-related injuries").
105. See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND.
L. REv. 681, 711 (1980) (observing that manufacturers "often are in a far better position
than consumers to discover, evaluate, and act upon, dangers that inhere in the products that
they make and sell").
106. See Craig Brown, Deterrence and Accident Compensation Schemes, 17 W. ONT. L.
REV. 11, 128 (1977-78) (stating that strict liability "provides an incentive for those engaged
in a particular activity to make it safer, for by doing so, their costs will be lower"); Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33
VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1289 (1980) (declaring that "forcing individuals and firms with a
measure of control over accident costs to absorb those costs provides an incentive to reduce
the accident rate, the consequences of accidents, or both").
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to exercise sufficient vigilance to avoid injury. At the same time, it seems
appropriate to allow warnings to suffice in cases where consumers can easily
avoid injury by heeding warnings or following directions. 7 To require
manufacturers to redesign their products in such cases will cause resources
to be wasted on over-designed products.
But if this is the case, then neither the old commeni approach nor
the new comment 1 approach will necessarily optimize accident costs.
Comment j assumes that consumers will always be the cheapest accident
cost avoiders, while comment I stands for the proposition that producers are
inherently better at preventing accidents than consumers. Since neither of
these assumptions is universally correct, I believe that it is better to allow
manufacturers to provide warnings, even when it was possible to eliminate
the risk by redesigning the product, when the additional cost of the
alternative design is greater than the increased accident costs that occur
when only a warning is provided. To illustrate this point, assume that a
warning would be essentially costless and would reduce existing accident
costs by $200, while a safer alternative design would cost the manufacturer
an additional $500, but would reduce accident costs by $600. The original
design plus warning option would result in a net reduction in social costs of
$200. A safer alternative design would also result in a net reduction of
social costs, but only of $100 ($600-$500) even though it would produce
fewer accident costs. In this 'case, therefore, the first alternative would be
more cost efficient than the second alternative, although both alternatives
would be more efficient than doing nothing at all. Consequently, the most
efficient liability rule is one which would encourage the first alternative
rather than the second.
Of course, one could argue that the comment/ approach does not
always require the manufacture to redesign a dangerous product. In the
107. As Professor Latin has pointed out, cognitive limitations and heuristic biases
sometimes affect the ability of consumers to understand warnings or to evaluate risk
objectively. See Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994). See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995); Richard G. Noll &
James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulations, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990); Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New
Homes: Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and
Consumer Psychologists Under One Roof, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 13.
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example discussed above, a manufacturer would theoretically escape
liability if it could show that a warning was more cost-effective than a safer
alternative design. Unfortunately, few juries really understand, or
sympathize with, the notion that a manufacturer could deliberately choose
to subject consumers to a known risk when this risk could be eliminated by
an alternative safer design. What is needed, therefore, if economic
efficiency is an important goal, is a rule that effectively protects producers
from jury scrutiny when they make product safety decisions based on an
objective assessment of costs and benefits.
2. Distributive Effects
Commentators often argue that the secondary costs of accidents can
be reduced if losses are spread among a large group of people instead of
being allowed to fall entirely on a small group of individuals.'0° Since
product sellers are thought to be better loss-spreaders than individual
consumers, 109 it advances the goal of loss-spreading if accident costs are
shifted from consumers to producers." 0 Since the approach embodied in
comment I is more expansive, than the approach embodied in the old
comment j, one can argue perhaps that comment/'s approach is superior
because it results in more liability, and hence more loss spreading, than the
108. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499, 517 (1961) (maintaining that "taking a large sum of money from one person
is more likely to result in economic dislocation ... than taking a series of small sums from
many people..."). Secondary accident cost avoidance, therefore, is concerned with
reducing the adverse economic effects that result when people suffer serious personal
injuries. See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL.
L. REv. 772, 794 (1985) (declaring that "secondary cost avoidance involves allocating injury
costs so as to decrease the economic dislocation caused by injuries").
109. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability,
69 CAL. L. REv. 919, 934 (1981) (stating that "manufacturers are believed to be better able
to obtain insurance thfin are consumers, and are assumed to be able to pass on most, if not
all, of the insurance costs by raising the prices of products").
110. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) (declaring that "the cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can
be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business").
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rule in commentj. ' I am skeptical of this argument, not because it is
illogical, but because I have doubts about the use of loss spreading as a
rationale for the existing tort liability regime.
First, as mentioned above, the conventional case for loss spreading
assumes that product sellers can spread losses more cheaply and effectively
than consumers." 2 However, this assumption has not been proven and it is
quite possible that individual consumers can insure against loss more
cheaply than producers."3 Second, the vast majority of consumers already
have health, life, disability insurance or workers compensation protectio 4
and, therefore, any additional loss-spreading by means of tort liability is
redundant."' Finally, the high cost of litigation makes a tort system much
more expensive to operate than private first-party insurance schemes." 6
S111. I am not suggesting that Professor Phillips would make such an argument.
112. See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1980) (contending
that "[t]he manufacturer can spread the risk through insurance and price adjustments,
whereas the injured individual might suffer a crushing financial blow underwriting the loss
himself").
113. See James E. Brittain, Product Honesty Is the Best Policy: A Comparison of Doctors'
and Manufacturers' Duty to Disclose Drug Risks and the Importance of Consumer
Expectations in Determining Product Defect, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 342, 410 (1984) (declaring
that "[t]he blithe assumption underlying loss-spreading arguments that manufacturers are
in a better position than consumers to both bear and spread losses has never been empirically
verified").
114. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 558, 647-48
(1985) (pointing out that approximately 85% of the American population is protected
against accidents, either through private insurance or through government health care and
welfare programs).
115. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795, 798
(1987) (observing that "[o]nce tort law finally does deliver money to victims, a considerable
sum goes to duplicate compensation that they otherwise have or will receive from other
sources, such as health insurance, sick leave, Social Security, and the like").
116. Private insurance systems spend about 15 percent of their premium income on
administrative expenses. See Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade
Performance: Myths and Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 127, at 135
(Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) (stating that transaction costs "consume 30 percent-of the costs
of the workers' compensation system, 15 percent of health insurance, and just I percent of
the social security system"). In contrast, the tort system's overhead rate is closer to 50
percent. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 13, 35 (1988) ("Reduced to a single figure, injury victims were receiving
slightly less than half of every dollar expended by the system on accident claims").
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3. Moral Issues
Some legal commentators stress that product sellers have a strong
moral responsibility to protect consumers against harm from defective
products." 7 They are right, of course, but I would suggest that consumers
and other parties have moral responsibilities as well. For example, I believe
as a matter of personal autonomy, that one should be allowed to consume
products, such as whiskey, butter or tobacco, that are inherently dangerous
or unhealthy; .. but at the same time, an individual who engages in such
risky behavior can not expect product sellers to compensate them when they
are injured while engaging in risky behavior. Unfortunately, many
consumers seem to feel that they are entitled to compensation regardless of
how much they may have contributed to their own injury.' 9
As a matter of personal autonomy and responsibility, when
consumers have the ability to prevent injury by heeding warnings or
following simple directions but deliberately fail to do so, I do not believe
that they should recover from product manufacturers for their own
carelessness. 2° The unfairness of this practice is exacerbated by the large
damage awards that these people often receive. For example, inMartinez,
the plaintiff, an individual who ignored clear warnings and refused to use
safety equipment obtained ajudgment of more than $10 million.'2 ' Even if
the plaintiff actually received only $6 million after paying attorneys' fees
117. See Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search ofa Standard ofResponsibility,
39 WAYNE L. REv. 1217, 1271-319 (1993) (proposing a standard for product design that
reflects the special relationship of trust that exists between manufacturers and their
customers).
118. See Robin L. West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659, 673 (1990)
("He chooses what he prefers, he prefers what he wants, he wants what he desires, and he
desires what is in his interest. Therefore, his interest is best promoted by leaving him with
whatever his choices have yielded.").
119. See Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet
Responsibilities, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 649, 674 (1995) (observing that "[tihere is no
shortage of people who could have protected themselves through simple, inexpensive
measures but preferred to expose themselves to injury and then sue others who arguably
might have protected them through more complex, expensive measures").
120. I would not characterize inadvertent or reflexive actions as either deliberate or
careless.
121. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998).
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and litigation expenses, this would have produced a comfortable income of
at least $300,000 a year without having to dip into his multi-million dollar
nest egg. Overcompensation on that scale is bad enough under any
circumstances, but it is particularly outrageous when the recipient is largely
responsible for his injuries. Of course, it is not the manufacturer who
ultimately pays when it is forced to design "foolproof' products; rather, this
financial burden falls primarily upon responsible consumers who are
required to pay for safety features they neither want nor need.
Of course, as Professor Phillips points out,'22 courts can instruct
juries to apply comparative fault principles and reduce damage awards when
injured consumers are careless or negligent. Thus, at least in theory,
comparative fault forces careless victims to bear some of the losses they
inflict on themselves. That is the way comparative fault is supposed to
work; in reality, comparative fault works somewhat differently. Although
I have no empirical evidence to support my conclusions, I strongly suspect
that when juries are sympathetic to the plaintiff, they either refuse to apply
comparative fault principles at all23 or they increase the size of their award
(after all no one can objectively measure pain and suffering) prior to
applying the comparative fault formula, thereby ending up with the verdict
they would have reached anyway.
Another problem with the approach taken by commentl is that it
allows third parties to escape responsibility for their wrongdoing. Parents,
fellow employees and employers are some of the worst offenders. In
Simpson v. Standard Container,2 " for example, primary responsibility for
the child's injury ought to have been placed on the parents who ignored
explicit warnings and allowed two small children to play with a container
filled with gasoline. Arguably, this act of stupidity pales in comparison with
the failure of the manufacturer to equip the container with a child-proof
cap.'25 Likewise, in Rogers v. Ingersoll Rand Co.,2 6 the employee who
122. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 7-8 (citing Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez,
928 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
123. For example, the jury in Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez refused to attribute
any responsibility to the victim even though he failed to determine the correct size of the tire
and declined to use a tire-changing machine. 977 S.W.2d at 340. The jury's decision was
upheld by two appellate courts. Id.
124. 527 A.2d 1337 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
125. See also Larue v. National Union Electric Corp., 571 F.2d 51 (1 Cir. 1978) (parents
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backed up a heavy machine in an area crowded with people without
bothering to see if anyone was in the path of the vehicle was the one who
was primarily responsible for the plaintiff's injuries, not the machine's
manufacturer.127 Of course, the guilty employee paid nothing, while the
product manufacturer was stuck with a $17 million dollar judgment.'28 In
the Martinez case, while the victim contributed to the accident by ignoring
the tire manufacturer's warnings, his employer also was at fault for failing
to provide an operable tire-changing machine, an action that would have
prevented the accident as effectively as anything the tire manufacturer could
have done.
129
In sum, the liability rule reflected in comment unfairly shifts the
entire accident-cost-avoidance burden to product sellers while exonerating
more culpable parties, such as victims, parents, employers and fellow
workers. Such results are morally suspect to say the least.
C. An Alternative Approach
Professor Phillips rightly criticizes the approach reflected in
comment J because it allows a manufacturer to satisfy its duty to the
consumer by providing a warning even in cases where the warning will not
be effective. On the other hand, the approach adopted by comment 1 does
not place sufficient responsibility on consumers; even they can and should
take the initiative to look out for their own safety. This suggests that a new
approach might be superior to either of these alternatives.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to develop an approach that will avoid
removed filters from vacuum cleaner thereby exposing fan blade, left vacuum cleaner
plugged in in hallway, and left small children home alone); Kerr v. Koemm, 557 F. Supp.
283 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (father allowed three-year-old child to ride on running board of farm
tractor); Erkson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 841 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)
(grandparents placed two-year-old child to ride in wooden box, intended as a seat for the
family dog, mounted on a riding lawnmower).
126. 144 F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
127. See also Niffenegger v. Lakeland Constr. Co., 420 N.E.2d 262 (I11. Ct. App. 1981)
(construction worker injured when asphalt-spreading machine ran over his foot).
128. See Rogers, 144 F.3d 841.
129. See Martinez, 977 S.W.2d at 340. See also Hagans v. Oliver Machine Co., 576 F.2d
97, 99 (5t' Cir. 1978) (employer removed safety guard from industrial table saw); Baldwin
v. Harris Corp., 751 F. Supp. 2, 4 (D.D.C. 1990) (employer disengaged safety device on
paper cutter); Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 923 (Minn. 1986)
(employer removed safety bar from hydraulic press).
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the Scylla and Charybdis of comments j and 1. One possibility would be to
return to the approach taken by comment j, that a safer design is not
required when a warning will do, 3' but articulate this as a strong
presumption rather than as a categorical rule. A presumptive approach, such
as this, would provide a safe harbor for producers, but still allow a court to
impose liability in particularly egregious cases. Courts could also give more
weight to compliance with statutory or administrative safety standards.'3 '
Thus, manufacturers who complied with statutory design standards could
argue that their products were presumptively reasonably safe, thereby
reducing the opportunity forjuries to second guess their design decision4.3
DEFECTIVE WARNINGS, DEFECTIVE DESIGNS, AND
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
Section 6(c) of the Third Restatement sets forth the requirements
victims must meet in order to recover against sellers of prescription drugs
or medical devices under a design defect claim, while section 6(d)
establishes the criteria for failure-to-warn claims.'33 Professor Phillips
believes that these provisions do not provide enough protection for
consumers.'34 On the other hand, I would conclude that the FDA's strict
licensing process and the availability of trained personnel to serve as learned
intermediaries provide adequate protection for consumers. Consequently,
I would conclude that tort law should not play a significant role in the
130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 2 cmt. I (1998).
131. See Christopher S. D'Angelo, Effect of Compliance or Noncompliance with
Applicable Governmental Product Safety Regulations on a Determination of Product Defect,
36 So. TEX. L. REv. 453, 460 (1995) (criticizing the Third Restatement of Torts for failing
to give more weight to compliance with government safety standards); William A.
Worthington, The "Citadel" Revisited: Strict Tort Liability and the Policy of Law, 36 So.
TEx. L. REv. 227, 276-77 (1995) (arguing for a stronger regulatory compliance defense in
the Third Restatement of Torts).
132. See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense,
55 MD. L. Rv. 1210, 1253-57 (1996) (proposing that sellers whose warnings and designs
comply with applicable government product safety standards be protected against liability
unless plaintiffs can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the applicable safety
standards are grossly inadequate).
133. See RESTATEMENT (THR) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LtAarLrrv §§ 6(c)-(d)(1998).
134. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 10-16.
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production and marketing of prescription drugs or medical devices.
A. Requirements for Design Defect and Failure-to-Warn Claims
Section 6(c) declares that a prescription drug or medical device will
be regarded as defectively designed if the foreseeable risks posed by the
product "[a]re sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic
benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable
risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical
device for any class of patients."'' 35 As Professor Phillips observes, this
provision effectively limits the design defect liability of drug manufacturers
to situations where the product has virtually no therapeutic value'?6 If this
minimal threshold requirement is met, injured parties can recover only if the
manufacturer fails to warn their prescribing physicians about foreseeable
risks of harm.
According to Professor Phillips, the drafters of this provision
mistakenly assume that if a manufacturer is forced to redesign a drug which
is useful for one class of patients in order to make it safer for another class
of users, the redesigned drug will then be less useful to the original class of
users. l' In his view, it makes sense to encourage the manufacturer to
redesign a dangerous drug because the redesigned drug might be safer for
the second class of users without necessarily losing its utility for the first
class of users. 138 In the alternative, the manufacturer might develop separate
designs for each class of user and thereby minimize the harmful effects of
the first design.
Section 6(d) states that the supplier of a prescription drug or
medical device will be subject to liability if reasonable instructions or
warnings are not provided to prescribing physicians or other health care
providers.'39 This provision also declares that drug manufacturers may be
held liable for failure to warn patients (as opposed to the prescribing
physicians and health care providers) when they know that these learned
135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LLABiLrrY § 6(c)(1998).
136. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 13.
137. Id. at 11-13.
138. Id.
139. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LiABIrry § 6(c)(1998).
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intermediaries will be unable to reduce product-related risks by following
instructions or warnings.'40 Professor Phillips questions the merits of this
provision on two grounds: first, the Reporters are wrong to assume that
learned intermediaries will always act reasonably; 141 second, the direct
marketing of prescription drugs by pharmaceutical companies undermines
the learned intermediary doctrine's rationale.1
4 1
B. The Issue from a Doctrinal Perspective
Section 6(c) departs from section 402A, comment's "unavoidably
unsafe" analysis. Comment k provided that when products were incapable
of being made safe for their intended use, but were sufficiently beneficial,
their continued production and use was fully justified, notwithstanding the
high degree of rlisk associated with their use, and they would be classified
as "unavoidably unsafe."'14  Sellers of such unavoidably unsafe products
would not be subject to strict liability in tort as long as the products were
properly prepared and marketed, and as long as a proper warning was
given.'" Although comment k was not expressly limited to any particular
kind of product, courts traditionally applied it only to pharmaceutical
products. 14'
Although section 6(c) does not use the term "unavoidably unsafe"
like its predecessor, section 402A, comment k, its treatment of prescription
drugs and medical devices is similar to section 402A's basic approach. For
example, section 6(c) appears to cover the same sorts of pharmaceuticals as
its predecessor, namely chemical drugs, biologics such as antibiotics, blood
and vaccines, as well as medical devices. Furthermore, like comment k,
section 6(c) requires drug manufacturers to warn about inherent product-
related risks if they wish to avoid tort liability. However, section 6(c)'s
140. Id.
141. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 13-16.
142. Id.
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
144. Id.
145. See Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products Liability:
What Liability Rule Should be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 KY.
L.J. 705, 713-15 (1989-90) (observing that almost all comment k cases have involved
pharmaceuticals, but discussing a few that have involved other products).
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formula for determining the product's social utility is somewhat different
than comment k's. In theory, under comment k, courts engaged in a
perfunctory form of risk-utility analysis in order to determine whether a
product's therapeutic benefits outweighed its inherent risks.'46 In contrast,
section 6(c) uses the prescribing practices of "reasonable health care
providers" as a proxy for determining a prescription drug's therapeutic
utility. The assumption seems to be that courts should not independently
evaluate the risks and benefits of prescription drugs, but should instead defer
to the judgment of health care professionals.'47 This is reminiscent of the
deference shown to the medical profession in malpractice cases by courts
which employ the "accepted practice" rule.
48
Section 6(d) declares that pharmaceutical manufacturers can satisfy
their duty to warn in most instances by communicating their warnings to
"prescribing and other health care professionals" and do not have to directly
warn the ultimate users or consumers of their products. 149 This approach
follows the traditional "learned intermediary" rule, which provides that the
manufacturer of a prescription drug has no duty to inform a patient about
drug-related risks as long as it provides an adequate warning to the patient's
prescribing physician. 5 The rule also applies to medical devices. 5 '
146. Id. at 716.
147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. b (1998).
148. See Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Carefor the Medical Profession:
the "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1213, 1234-36 (1975) (discussing the
accepted practice rule).
149. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiABLrrY § 6(d) (1998).
150. See Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 811 (5' Cir.), cert. denied, 504
U.S. 956 (1992) (failure to communicate directly with patient does not make a product
defective as long as manufacturer provides an adequate warning to learned intermediary);
Anderson v. McNeilab, Inc., 831 F.2d 92, 93 (5"' Cir. 1987) seller of prescription drug
satisfies its duty to warn by informing prescribing physician about product's inherent
dangers); Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 878 (Ohio 1991)
(manufacturer discharges its duty to warn by adequately communicating with prescribing
physician). See also Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users:
Encouraging the Use of Intermediaries to Transmit Product Safety Information, 46
SYRACUSEL. REv. 1185, 1195-200 (1996) (discussing the learned intermediary rule).
151. See Willett v. Baxter Int'l, 929 F.2d 1094, 1098 (5t' Cir. 1991) (artificial heart valve);
Phelps v. Sherwood Med. Indus., 836 F.2d 296, 303 (7' Cir. 1987) (heart catheter); Brooks
v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4"' Cir. 1984) (cardiac pacemaker). See also Lars
Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability
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Warnings can be communicated to physicians by means of package inserts,
advertisements in medical journals or the Physician's Desk Reference,
letters to physicians or by office visits from company representatives
(formerly known as "detail men").'52
The learned intermediary rule assumes that the prescribing
physician will act as an intermediary between the manufacturer and the
patient. 53 Consequently, once the manufacturer warns the physician, the
burden shifts to the physician to pass this information on to his or her
patients.'54 Although the learned intermediary doctrine has been criticized
by some commentators,'55 it continues to be recognized in almost all
jurisdictions. 5 6 Thus, the Third Restatement's retention of the learned
intermediary rule is entirely consistent with the prevailing case law.
C. The Issue from a Policy Perspective
In my opinion, section 6's treatment of prescription drugs and
medical devices appears to optimize accident costs and it also establishes a
liability regime which permits manufacturers to market essential products
at reasonable cost to consumers.
Issues, 32 GA. L. REv. 141, 156 (1997) (declaring that some courts have extended the
learned intermediary doctrine to implantable medical devices).
152. See Donald E. Thompson II, Comment, The Drug Manufacturer's Duty to Warn-To
Whom Does It Extend?, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 135, 144 (1985).
153. See Barbara M. McGarey, Comment, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Consumer-
Directed Information-Enhancing the Safety of Prescription Drug Use, 34 CATH. U. L. REV.
117, 122-23 (1984).
154. See Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) (declaring that
once the manufacturer warns the physician, "the choice of treatment and the duty to disclose
properly fall on the doctor").
155. See, e.g., Margaret Gilhooley, Learned Intermediaries, Prescription Drugs and
Patient Information, 30 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 633, 657-58 (1986) (contending that
"[t]he change in the informed consent doctrine makes appropriate a corresponding change
in the role that the physician should perform as 'learned intermediary"'); Susan A. Casey,
Comment, Laying an Old Doctrine to Rest: Challenging the Wisdom of the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine, 19 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 931, 958 (1993) (arguing that "the
learned intermediary doctrine is based on medical paternalism that is inconsistent with the
concept of informed consent").
156. See Barbara P. Flannagan, Comment, Products Liability: The Continued Viability of
the Learned Intermediary Rule as It Applies to Product Warnings for Prescription Drugs,
20 U. RICH. L. REv. 405, 411 (1986) (acknowledging that the learned intermediary doctrine
is universally recognized in the United States).
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1. Accident Costs
Arguably, section 6(c) optimizes accident costs by ensuring that the
benefits of a prescription drug will outweigh its benefits. However, instead
of allowing juries to evaluate a drug's risks and benefits in the context of
litigation, which is the way section 2 deals with design defect claims, section
6(c) employs surrogates to perform this function. The first of these
surrogates is the FDA, which engages in a sophisticated risk-benefit analysis
as part of its drug-licensing process.' The Reporters expressly rely on the
FDA to act as a regulatory watchdog and keep unreasonably dangerous
drugs off the market. 5 ' The medical profession also acts as a surrogate.
Section 6 immunizes only drugs which have been recognized as effective
and beneficial by prescribing physicians. Thus, physicians as a group
determine the drug's overall utility by deciding whether to prescribe it or
not.
Section 6(d) also promotes economic efficiency by allowing
physicians to make individualized determinations of costs and benefits for
each of their patients. While manufacturers could warn patients directly by
means of package inserts, it would be difficult to communicate such
complex and technical information in a way that would be comprehensible
to ordinary consumers. 159 In contrast, physicians are ideal sources of
information for consumers. Not only can prescribing physicians understand
technical data, but they can translate this information into language that lay
persons can understand. In addition, physicians can screen information
provided by the manufacturer so that patients receive only such information
157. See Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Macider, Food and Drug Administration Regulation
and Product Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 ToRT & INS. L.J. 194, 203-04 (1987)
(describing the FDA's drug approval procedures).
158. See RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LILITY § 6 (1998) (Reporters'
Note 146) (stating that "government regulatory agencies adequately review new prescription
drugs and devices, keeping unreasonably dangerous products off the market").
159. See Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the
Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REv. 141, 159 (1997) (pointing out that "because
of the complexity of risk information about prescription drugs, comprehension problems
would complicate any effort by manufacturers to translate physician labeling for lay
patients").
[Vol. 26:3
WHEN WARNINGS ALONE WON'T DO
as is directly relevant to their medical condition."W Thus, by utilizing
physicians to communicate information about product-related risks to their
patients, the learned intermediary rule takes advantage of the existing
physician-patientrelationship and thus ensures that such information will be
communicated to the ultimate recipient cheaply and effectively.' 6 '
2. Distributive Effects
The liability rules adopted by section 6 of theThird Restatement are
less favorable to injured consumers than the approaches suggested by
Professor Phillips. In effect, individual product users will be prevented from
shifting product-related losses to drug manufacturers and, instead, will have
to bear these losses themselves. At first blush, this result seems contrary to
the loss-spreading goals of products liability. However, some
countervailing arguments can be made in response to this claim. First, most
of those who suffer drug-related injuries will have health insurance (since
by hypothesis they are receiving medical treatment) and may also have
disabilityor life insurance. Consequently,a large proportion of their out-of-
pocket expenses will be spread by means of first-party insurance. In such
cases, the primary loss that would be left unspread would be pain and
suffering, a type of loss that most victims are less concerned with recouping,
at least as compared with pecuniary losses. '62 Second, and more
160. See Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984).
161. See Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users:
Encouraging the Use of Intermediaries to Transmit Product Safety Information, 46
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1185, 1229 (1996) (arguing that physicians can transmit information to
patients more effectively than drug manufacturers).
162. See Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendant's Payment for Pain and
Suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants'Attorneys'Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 333,
364 (declaring that "[e]ven among the seriously injured, payment for pain and suffering,
while more important than to the general public, was still ranked much less important than
protection against the claims of others and payment for medical expenses, property damage,
and wage loss"). This conclusion is reinforced by data that suggests that most people would
be unwilling to purchase private insurance to compensate them for nonpecuniary injuries.
See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance
Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 520 (1984); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products
Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 362-67 (1988) (describing the
insurance theory of compensation); Ellen S. Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and
the Kingdom of the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV.
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importantly, prescription drugs are vital necessities for many people. At the
same time, the drug industry has historically been prone to over deterrence.
Thus, in many instances, drug producers have taken apparently useful
products off the market, or raised drug prices dramatically, in response to
concerns about tort liability. 63 Arguably, the Third Restatement's approach,
though ungenerous to injured consumers, is necessary to protect a greater
public interest.
CONCLUSION
Sections 2 and 6 of the Third Restatement deal with a number of
difficult and interesting matters. Although Professor Phillips and I do not
see eye to eye on very much, we agree on this much: The Third Restatement
is not consistent in its treatment of the duty-to-wam/duty-to-design issud.
Under Section 2 a warning will not do when the product seller can eliminate
or reduce the danger by redesigning the product; however, under section 6,
a manufacturer need only warn about a product-related risk and is under no
duty to redesign the product in order to make it safer. The Reportersjustify
this apparent discrepancy on the basis that different liability rules are needed
for prescription drugs. Professor Phillips and I would prefer to see the same
set of liability rules applied to all products. We differ, however, over what
the appropriate liability rule should be. In general, Professor Phillips would
prefer that producers be required to take active steps to make their products
more safe; 65 on the other hand, I would prefer to shift more responsibility
for product safety to users and consumers and, thus, would give more
protection to producers as long as they provide adequate warnings and
instructions.
91, 99-104 (1993) (same); but see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary
Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1785,
1791 (1995) (arguing that the absence of a market for insurance against pain and suffering
does not indicate that people do not want such insurance).
163. See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
645, 648 (1985) (discussing Bendectin); Marc A. Franklin & Joseph E. Mais, Tort Law and
Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons from the Polio and Flu Episodes, 65 CAL. L. REV.
754, 765-66 (1977) (discussing polio vaccine); Richard Huber, Safety and Second Best: The
Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 287-89 (1985)
(discussing swine flu and DPT vaccines).
164. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 26-31.
165. Id. at 32-33.
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